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NOTES
a natural development of administrative law, where agencies possess
both quasi legislative and quasi judicial authority. There is no inherent
contradiction involved in the use of sub-legislative discretion to interpret
statutory standards in aid of an adjudication. As long as the courts
remain as solicitous of individual rights as they have been in the past
and seriously insist upon the observance of due process, there is little
danger that ad hoc action will get out of control. It is true, as Justice
Jackson noted in his Chenery dissent, that ad hoc action places the pro-
priety of the rule beyond judicial review. But the courts can still in-
validate the action if it is unreasonable or if it inflicts injury out of
proportion to its public value. Despite its retroactivity, if the remedial
aspect is appropriately conditioned to effectuate a statutory scheme, ad
hoc action may be a valuable instrument of administrative procedure.
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS:
A NEW DEPARTURE
The Supreme Court has spoken on agricultural cooperative activity
and the antitrust laws in a case that is representative of the conflict be-
tween congressional policies seeking to preserve a competitive business
economy, and those seeking to obtain better returns for farmers through
the medium of collective marketing.' That case is Maryland & Va. Milk
Producers Ass'n, v. United States.2
The result of the decision is an expression in unequivocal terms that
Capper-Volstead cooperatives are not privileged to engage in trade prac-
tices and methods of competition forbidden to business corporations.
This position marks a substantial departure from the Court's previous
expression in United States v. Borden Co.'
This note is an effort to analyze the Borden and laryland & Vir-
ginia cases, to determine the position of the federated cooperative in view
of the Maryland & Virginia decision, and to analyze the position of agri-
cultural cooperatives in the face of monopoly prohibitions.
Our basic idea of government is that public agencies will act in accord with
law that may be known in advance by citizens. It is difficult to read the
Court's decision in this case [Chenery] without getting the impression that,
within broad spheres of regulatory power, it now regards administrative agencies
as laws unto themselves.
1. Brief for Plaintiff, p. 28, Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United
States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
2. 362 U.S. 458. (1960).
3. 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
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In Borden, a producer's cooperative was charged with participating
in a combination and conspiracy of milk distributors, a milk drivers
union, and municipal officials to restrain interstate commerce in fluid
milk in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.4 The cooperative al-
legedly entered into a price fixing agreement with the distributors and
refused to supply those distributors who failed to adhere to the agreed
price.5 The Supreme Court unanimously held, that Section 2 of the
Capper-Volstead Act6 gave the Secretary of Agriculture auxilliary juris-
diction only, and that nothing in Section 2 of the Act7 authorized price-
fixing conspiracies between agricultural cooperatives and "others."'
Thus the Supreme Court rejected the popular belief that Capper-
Volstead cooperatives enjoyed absolute immunity from antitrust prosecu-
tion.' Instead, the Court concluded that activities of agricultural co-
operatives in conjunction with "other persons" were not beyond the am-
bit of the antitrust laws. The question remained, however, whether
4. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations is
declared illegal." 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
5. United States v. Borden Co., 28 F. Supp. 177 (W.D. Ill. 1939). The combina-
tion was also charged with fixing prices to be paid independent producers and restricting
the supply of milk intot Chicago. The District Court held, in part, that Capper-Volstead
exempted co-operatives from the prohibitions of the Sherman Act and that § 2 of the
Capper-Volstead Act gave the Secretary of Agriculture primary jurisdiction over
cooperative activity.
6. Capper-Volstead Act § 2: "If the Secretary of Agriculture shall have reason
to believe that any such association monopolizes or restrains trade in interstate or foreign
commerce to such an extent that the price of any agricultural product is unduly enhanced
by reason thereof [he may direct such association, after a "show cause" hearing,] .. .
to cease and desist from monopolization or restraint of trade. . . ." If an association
fails to comply with the Secretary's order, enforcement passes to the Department of
Justice. 42 Stat. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1958).
7. Capper-Volstead Act § 1: "Persons engaged in the production of agricultural
products as farmers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers may act together
in associations corporate or otherwise, with or without capital stock, in collectively pro-
cessing, preparing for market, handling and marketing in interstate and foreign com-
merce, such products of persons so engaged. Such associations may have marketing
agencies in common; and such associations and their members may make the necessary
contracts and agreements to effect such purposes: Provided, however, that such associa-
tions are operated for the mutual benefit of the members thereof, as such producers, and
conform to one or both of the following requirements:
First: that no member of the association is allowed more than one vote because of
the amount of stock or membership capital he may own therein, or,
Second: that the association does not pay dividends on stock or membership capital
in excess of 8 per centum per annum.
And in any case to the following:
Third: that the association shall not deal in the products of non-members to an
amount greater in value than such as are handled by it for members." 42 Stat. 388
(1922), 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1958).
8. See generally Notes, 27 VA. L. Rav. 674 (1941), 88 U. PA. L. Rav. 493 (1940).
9. The confusion seems to have stemmed from an opinion of the Attorney General
36 Ops. ArY. GEN. 326, 333 (1930). Portions of the legislative history also gave
support to the proposition. See footnote 29 infra.
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Borden was a definitive statement of the extent of cooperative privilege
or merely a limited scope opinion. The Maryland & Virginia case pro-
vides the answer to this question. Although aspects of Maryland & Vir-
ginia were analogous to Borden, the case was not resolved by application
of the "other persons" principle. Rather, the Court promulgated a new
departure in the realm of permissive cooperative activity in the process
of definitively stating the extent of the privilege conferred on agricul-
tural cooperatives by the Capper-Volstead Act and Section 6 of the
Clayton Act.'"
At the time of trial, the Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers As-
sociation (hereinafter referred to as the Association) was composed of
1,950 dairy farmers who produced 86% of the milk consumed in the
District of Columbia, and 45% of the milk consumed at military estab-
lishments in the area. Of the twelve dairies in the locale, all but four
purchased the bulk of their supply from the Association." It was the
purchase of the largest of these independent distributors, the Embassy
Dairy, that motivated the Department of Justice to charge violations of
Section 3 of the Sherman Act 2 and Section 7 of the Clayton Act."
Embassy had sold to government establishments over 47% of all govern-
ment purchases and accounted for 9.5% of the milk sales in the Wash-
10. Clayton Act § 6: "The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article
of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted
for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit,
or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying
out the legitimate objects; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be
held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under
the antitrust laws." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1958).
11. United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799,
804 (D.D.C. 1958). The Association was the only Capper-Volstead Cooperative serving
Washington, D. C.
12. Sherman Act § 3: "Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce in any territory of the U.S. or in the
District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such territory
and another, or between any such territory or territories and any state or states of the
District of Columbia or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia and
any state or states or foreign nations, is declared illegal." 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1958).
13. Clayton Act § 7: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly
or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole
or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in
any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. .. ."
"Nothing contained in this section shall apply to transactions duly consummated pur-
suant to authority given by [certain administrative agencies] . . . or the Secretary of
Agriculture under any statutory provision vesting such power in such Commission,
Secretary, or Board." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
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ington area."4
The Association was troubled in 1953 by a surplus of milk, which
by 1954 had caused a substantial decrease in the blend price." In an
attempt to alleviate this situation, an assistant secretary of the Associa-
tion contacted the owner of Embassy and offered to sell him some of the
surplus. Embassy's owner declined. Instead, he offered to sell Embassy
to the Association. 6 After considering the proposal, the Association's
officers sent member producers a memorandum that stated, in part, that
the purchase would be beneficial in that it would eliminate the area's most
notorious advocate of the practice of importing uninspected surplus milk
from other markets.' Another benefit noted was that the replacement
of milk from other areas with Association milk would decrease the As-
sociation's surplus and increase its blend price. An increase in the As-
sociation's membership of some sixty to seventy producers (out of the
one hundred and twenty-two selling to Embassy) was also anticipated."8
The Government's case included proof that the Association paid al-
most double the value of the assets-over $2,940,000 for fixed assets
having a value of approximately $1,600,000.'" Another factor in the
transaction was an agreement by Embassy's owner that he would not
compete in the Washington area for ten years; and that he would at-
tempt to persuade the independent producers who supplied him to either
sell to distributors who purchased from the Association or join the
Association.2 0
Another aspect of the case raised the question as to how far anti-
14. United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799,
804 (D.D.C. 1958). As a result of the transaction the Association was in a position
to supply 95.5% of the milk consumed in the Washington area, and 92% of the milk
consumed at local government establishments.
15. Brief for Defendant, p. 9, citing Record, p. 378. The blend price is generally
determined by averaging the receipts from the three use classifications into which milk
generally is divided. Class I is composed of milk resold by distributors as fluid milk,
and of course provides the highest cash returns. Class II is composed of milk manu-
factured into cream and chocolate milk. Class III is composed of unsold or surplus
milk which each distributor has on his hands and which he sells for manufacture into
by-products such as ice cream, cheese, condensed evaporated milk, and other dairy
commodities." Surplus milk is a serious problem everywhere because the prices which
can be realized for it are much less than the prices realized for milk and cream sold
for consumption in fluid form." Hanna, Cooperative Milk Marketing and Restraint of
Trade, 23 Ky. L.J. 217, 239 (1935). For a case upholding the validity of the classified
use plan see Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 193 F.2d 907 (D.C.
Cir. 1951) reversing 90 F. Supp. 681 (D.D.C. 1950).
16. Brief for Defendant, p. 10, citing Record, p. 384.
17. The practice is known in the trade as "Bootlegging."
18. United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799,
805, 806 (D.D.C. 1958).
19. Brief for Plaintiff, p. 8 citing Record, p. 558.
20. Brief for Plaintiff, p. 9, citing Record, p. 590.
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trust policy had been qualified by Acts of Congress, in addition to the
Capper-Volstead and Clayton Acts. The Baltimore Bank for Coopera:
tives authoirized by the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929 to make
loans to cooperatives for "the construction or acquisition of physical fa-
cilities,"21 lent the Association $2,100,000 for the purchase of Embassy.22
The Report of the Bank's secretary, which recommended the loan, stated
that the Association wanted to eliminate "an unstable influence" from
the market, and obtain another outlet for its surplus milk." The Report
relied, in part, upon an analysis of the economic desirability of the Em-
bassy acquisition which the Bank, upon request, had obtained from the
Department of Agriculture."
The Maryland & Virginia case would appear to be factually similar
to the Bf'den case as to the Sherman section 3 and Clayton section 7
charges arising from the Embassy transaction. Both involved a restraint
of trade as a result of a combination of an entity operating under the
provisions of the Capper-Volstead Act with one (or more) non-
cooperative entities. Furthermore, the problem in both cases was to de-
termine how far Congressional cooperative policies were intended to
modify Congressional antitrust policies. The fact that Borden involved
a loose combination and Maryland & Virginia a merger, would not seem
to warrant a distinction in treatment insofar as tne application of "other
persons" was concerned. Nor are mergers in restraint of trade anymore
condemned under the antitrust laws than price fixing.2" One distinguish-
ing factor of importance was that, unlike Borden, the Court also had to
contend with the District Courts dismissal of a charge of monopolization
and attempted monopolization in violation of section 2 of the Sherman
Act.
But the Court did not rest that part of its decision analogous to the
21. 46 Stat. 14, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 114e (19FS).
22. The Association financed the remainder of the purchase by borrowing $750,000
from local banks, $407,000 from its members, and utilizing $748,000 of its own funds.
Brief for Plaintiff, p. 8, citing Record, p. 620.
23. Brief for Defendant, p. 11, citing Record, p. 574.
24. The study was made by Donald E. Hirsch, Chief, Dairy Branch, Farmer
Cooperative Service, United States Dep't. of Agriculture. The study stated, in part,
that although the Association seemed to under emphasize the problems of the transaction
and over emphasize the potential benefits, the Embassy purchase would provide it with
an "unusual opportunity" to increase its blend price. Brief for Defendant, p. 11,
citing Record, p. 717.
25. Price-fixing is illegal [per se] under the antitrust laws. United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) ; Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436
(1940) ; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). For cases apply-
ing the "new" § 7 of the Clayton Act see United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 16&
F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar
Co., 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958), affirming 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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Borden case on the "other persons" doctrine." Mr. Justice Black, speak-
ing for a unanimous Court, stated,
The full effect of section 6 is that a group of farmers acting
together as a single entity in an association cannot be re-
strained 'from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof,' but the section cannot support the contention that it
gives such an entity full freedom to engage in predatory trade
practices at will.27
Moreover, the Court stated that the philosophy of section 6 of the Clayton
Act and the Capper-Volstead Act is that farmers acting through coopera-
tives should be given "the same unified competitive advantages-and re-
sponsibility-" as businessmen acting through corporations.2" (Emphasis
added.) The opinion pointed out that a class privilege was not intended 21
26. This was the basis on which the District Court denied the Association's motion
to dismiss the Sherman § 3' and Clayton § 7 charges and granted its motion as to the
Sherman § 2 charge. United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167
F. Supp. 45 (D.D.C. 1958).
27. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458,
465, 466. For similar interpretations of § 6 see Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
254 U.S. 443, 469 (1921) ; United States v. King, 250 Fed. 908, 910 (D. Mass. 1916).
Some may contend that the opinion holds only those trade practices and methods of com-
petition that can be styled "predatory" as outside the "legitimate objects" of a Capper-
Volstead cooperative. This would be to suggest that the Court has promulgated special
standards for an exempt class under the antitrust laws similar to those found in the his-
tory of labor law legislation. In the light of the entire opinion such a position seems mis-
leading, and a last ditch attempt to give new life to the concept of a class privilege for
agricultural cooperatives. Any restraint of trade can be termed "predatory." In addition,
cooperatives are amendable to standards gauging the conduct of business corporations.
Thus, the coiicept of special standards for agricultural cooperatives is unnecessary as
well as unrealistic.
28. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458,
466. In addition the Court pointed out: "In the Borden case this Court held that
neither § 6 of the Clayton Act nor the Capper-Volstead Act granted immunity from
prosecution for the combination of a cooperative and others to restrain trade there charged
as a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Although the Court was not confronted with
charges under § 2 of the Sherman Act in that case, we do not believe that Congress
intended to immunize cooperatives engaged in competition-stifling practices from
prosecution under the anti-monopolization provisions of § 2 of the Sherman Act while
making them responsible for such practices as violations of the anti trade restraint
provisions of §§ 1 and 3 of that Act. These sections closely overlap and the same kind
of predatory practices may show violations of all." 362 U.S. 458, 463. For cases mani-
festing a contrary view see United States v. Maryland Co-op. Milk Producers Ass'n,
145 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1956); Farmers Co-op. Co. v. Birmingham, 86 F. Supp.
201, 229 (N.D. Iowa 1949) (dictum) ; United States v. Dairy Co-op. Ass'n, 49 F. Supp.
475 (D. Ore. 1943) ; United States v. Elm Spring Farm, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 508, 511 (D.
Mass. 1941) (dictum) ; modified on other grounds, 127 F.2d 920 (1st Cir. 1942).
29. Senator Capper stated, "The . . . bill . . . seeks simply to make definite
the law relating to cooperative associations of farmers and to establish a basis on
which these organizations may be legally formed." 62 CONG. REc. 2057 (1922). Repre-
sentative Volstead pointed out, "It is objected in some quarters that this repeals the
Sherman . . . Act as to farmers. That is not true any more than it is true that a
combination of two or three corporations violates the act. Such combinations may or
NOTES
and that the legislative history, "does not suggest a congressional desire to
vest cooperatives with unrestricted power to restrain trade or achieve mo-
nopoly by preying on independent producers, processors or dealers intent
on carrying on their own business in their own legitimate way.""0  The
Court concluded, "We hold that the privilege Capper-Volstead grants
producers to conduct their affairs collectively does not include a privilege
to combine with competitors so as to use a monopoly position as a lever
further to suppress competitors."'"
Given the similarity between the Borden and Maryland & Virginia
may not monopolize or restrain trade." 61 CoNG. REc. 1033 (1921). The House
judiciary Report concluded, "Instead of granting a class privilege it aims to equalize
existing privileges by changing the law applicable to the ordinary business corporations
so the farmers can take advantage of it. H.R. Doc. No. 24, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1921), 59 CONG. REC. 8033 (1920). On the other hand, a number of congressmen felt
a class privilege would result from the bill. 59 CONG. REC. 7857, 7858, 8054 (1920) and
61 CONG. Rnc. 1042 (1921). It is interesting to note also that the appropriations acts
for the Department of Justice between 1914-1928 contained the following: ". . . no part
of this appropriation shall be expended for the prosecution of producers of farm
products and associations of farmers who cooperate and organize in an effort to and
for the purpose to obtain and maintain a fair and reasonable price for their products."
Farmers Cooperative Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Bulletin No. 10, Legal
Phases of Farmer Cooperatives 250 (1958). Unfortunately, the Secretary of Agricul-
ture has failed to institute an action since Capper-Volstead became law. REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 313 (1955).
It is safe to say that even those congressmen who felt that § 2 would place enforcement
responsibility in the Secretary of Agriculture didn't intend total immunity.
30. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 466,
467. In affirming the § 7 judgment, the Court agreed with the District Court that the
acquisition tended to create a monopoly or substantially lessen competition. The opinion
reiterated the District Court's findings that "the motive and result of the Embassy
acquisition was to: eliminate the largest purchaser of non-Association milk in the area;
force former Embassy non-Association producers either to join the Association or ship
to Baltimore, thus both bringing more milk to the Association and diverting competing
milk to another market; eliminate the Association's prime competitive dealer from gov-
ernment contract milk bidding; and increase the Association's control of the Washington
market." 362 U.S. 458, 469. The § 3 charge was decided on the evidence offered on the
Clayton § 7 charge. The Supreme Court considered "crucial" the agreement not to
compete and the promised aid in obtaining Embassy's suppliers. The rivalry between
Association and Embassy producers, and the price paid for Embassy were also stressed.
No mention was made in the opinion of the role played by the Baltimore Bank for
Cooperatives or the Department of Agriculture. In referring to the Sherman § 3
judgment, the opinion pointed out that the facts found by the District Court show a
"classic combination or conspiracy to restrain trade" that found no justification in the
"necessary contracts" provision of the Capper-Volstead Act. "The Embassy assets the
Association acquired are useful in processing and marketing milk, and we may assume,
as it is contended, that their purchase simply for business use, without more, often
would be permitted and would be lawful under Capper-Volstead. But even lawful con-
tracts and business activities may help to m.ke up a pattern of conduct unlawful under
the Sherman Act. The contract . . . was not one made merely to advance the Associa-
tions own permissable processing and marketing business; it was entered into . . .
because of its usefulness as a weapon to restrain and suppress competitors and competi-
tion in the Washington . . . area." Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v.
United States, 362 U.S. 458, 471, 472.
31. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 472
(1960).
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cases, the Court could have rested its decision on the "other persons" doc-
trine of Borden. It is submitted that cooperative reliance on Borden far
exceeded its scope and that the concept of a class privilege-in the absence
of a clear Congressional expression-is repugnant to a philosophy that
seeks responsible behavior from those who deal in the market place.
There is nothing in the statutory framework32 that permits cooperatives
acting independently of the Secretary of Agriculture to engage in price
fixing activity with distributors. Thus, the Borden Court stated that the
activity was not authorized. In reaching this conclusion the opinion em-
phasized the privileged-non-privileged nature of the combination because
that was the basis of the District Court's decision as to the cooperative-
not the legality of price fixing. The Maryland & Virginia case, how-
ever, involved activity that is authorized, i.e., by the necessary contracts
provision of the Capper-Volstead Act. The Court therefore had to de-
cide whether antitrust violations were justified by the authorization.
In the process of holding that immunity has not been granted to co-
operative activities where similar activities by a business corporation
would violate the antitrust laws, the Court has provided the much needed
statement of the nature of the privilege granted to cooperatives by the
Capper-Volstead Act and section 6 of the Clayton Act. The reinstate-
ment of the Sherman section 2 charges emphasized the new departure
in the realm of permissive cooperative behavior under the antitrust laws:
Capper-Volstead cooperatives are not privileged to indulge in trade prac-
32. In addition to § 6 of the Clayton Act and the Capper-Volstead Act, he
following also deal with agricultural coopeiation. The Cooperative Marketing Act of
1926 authorized the establishment of a Division of Cooperative Marketing in the Depart-
ment of Agriculture. The Division is authorized, in part, to obtain, analyze, and
distribute information concerning cooperatives; conduct and publish studies of the
various phases of cooperation; analyze cooperative transactions upon request; publish
information concerning market conditions; and to advise groups desirous of forming
cooperatives. The Act also provides that cooperatives may exchange "crop, market,
statistical, economic, and other similar information [directly] and/or by and through
a common agent created or selected by them." 44 Stat. 802, 7 U.S.C. § 451-57 (1958).
The Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929 directs that the Congressional policy of
regulating the marketing of agricultural commodities "so that the industry of agriculture
will be placed on a basis of economic equality with other industries," should be carried
out in part, by reducing speculation, precluding "wasteful and inefficient" distribution,
utilizing "orderly production and distribution" to prevent and control surpluses and ex-
tensive price fluctuations, and by "promoting the establishment and financing" of agri-
cultural cooperatives. Authorization is also given to an agency of the Department of
Agriculture to make loans to cooperatives for physical expansion purposes. 46 Stat. 11,
12 U.S.C. § 1141 (1958).
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, in part, authorizes the
Secretary of Agriculture to enter into regional price-determining marketing agreements
with producers and handlers of agricultural commodities. Where such an agreement
cannot be reached, the Secretary is authorized, upon the consent of a prescribed number
of those involved to issue marketing orders that set minimum prices to be paid by
distributors to producers. 50 Stat. 246, 7 U.S.C. § 601-59 (1958).
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tices and methods of competition forbidden to business corporations. 3
The conclusion is inescapable that responsible cooperative behavior
is the message of Maryland & Virginia. In addition to the tenor of the
opinion, the Court condemned combination with competitors to suppress
competition and cited the Maryland Cooperative" case, a case that held
two competing Capper-Volstead cooperatives privileged to engage in
price fixing. This type of combination was thought, by some, to be
sacrosanct after the Borden decision. Therefore, by condemning anti-
trust violations arising from a combination with competitors-or by the
cooperative itself-as outside the legitimate objects of a Capper-Volstead
cooperative, "other persons" has been given its broadest meaning 5 and
the limitations and uncertainty Borden's specifically engendered have
been mitigated. Even the most cursory consideration of the statutory
scheme impresses one with the fact that Congress has sought to nurture
agricultural cooperation.36 Needless to say, during the formative years
of these producer associations such treatment was necessary. 7  However,
agricultural cooperation has passed from a formative period to one of
maturity and strength,"8 and responsible cooperative activity must be a
33. This conclusion has been anticipated by writers in the area. See, Saunders,
The Status of Agricultural Cooperatives Under the Antitrust Laws, 20 FED. B.J. (1960) ;
Mischler, Current Legal Developments Affecting Farmer Cooperatives, AIERICAN
COOPERATION 474 (1960); Hanna, Cooperative Associations and the Public, 29 MICH.
L. REv. 148 (1930) ; Note, 57 MICH. L. REv. 921 (1959) ; Note, 27 VA. L. REv. 674 (1941).
But see, Stark, Capper-Volstead Revisited, AMERICAN COOPERATION 464 (1960).
34. United States v. Maryland Co-op. Milk Producers Inc., 145 F. Supp. 151
(D.D.C. 1950). See text at notes 33 supra and 40-43 infra.
35. "Other persons" means many things to many people. To Judge Holtzoff it
meant non-Capper-Volstead Cooperatives. To the Association it meant persons not
involved in agricultural activity. Brief for Defendant, p. 3, Maryland & Va. Milk Pro-
ducers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960). In the labor law area "other
persons" has been confined to a prohibition against combinations of unions with em-
ployers or self-employed. Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
36. The Supreme Court has indulged in nutriment of sorts as well. In Liberty
Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers Co-op., 276 U.S. 271 (1928), a Kentucky
statute that prohibited warehousemen from purchasing produce from cooperative mem-
bers was held not to be an impairment of the warehousemen's freedom of contract.
When a statute purporting to exempt farmers from criminal antitrust sanctions was
challenged as being violative of equal protection in Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940) ;
the Court overruled its previous decision in Connoly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184
U.S. 540 (1902), and held the classification reasonable.
37. During the debate on the Capper-Volstead Act, one Senator stated, "... those
who do not want the organization, the men who have the business now, the middlemen
who are standing between the producer and the consumer and taking their toll, discourage
the organization of these . . . associations by the suggestion that they will be in
violation of law." 61 CONG. REc. 2165 (1921). "The efforts of farmers to engage in joint
marketing operations have from the first incurred active oppostion from the com-
mission merchants whom cooperative selling would replace." Jenson, Cooperative Corpor-
ation Law On the Marketing Transaction, 22 WAsH. L. REv. 1, 11 (1947).
38. There are approximately 9800 cooperatives in the United States today with a
total membership in excess of 7.6 million. Hill, Agricultural Cooperatives and the FTC,
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concomitant. The independent agriculturalist whose products are ex-
cluded from the market does not benefit from an attitude which favors
continued or additional nutriment of established cooperatives. He re-
quires nutriment today. The application of antitrust prohibitions to the
trade practices and methods of competition of agricultural cooperatives
will provide this nutriment on the one hand, and mature behavior on the
other. This certainly is consistent with Congressional agricultural co-
operative policy and the spirit of the cooperative movement."
In the Maryland Cooperative case,4" two competing Capper-Volstead
cooperatives were held privileged to engage in a conspiracy to fix prices
for milk sold to distributors effectuated by employees common to both
cooperatives. The case raised the serious question of whether the activ-
ity of a pair of cooperatives violates the antitrust laws where a similar
combination of business corporations would indubitably do so. The
opinion limited Borden's "other persons" doctrine to non-Capper-Volstead
cooperatives and concluded that as a result of section 6 of the Clayton
Act cooperatives may "combine with impunity" and "legally agree to fix
prices on their products." Moreover, the Court felt that Congress must
have foreseen that the privileged common marketing agency of Capper-
Volstead and common agent of the Cooperative Marketing Act of 1926
would lead to price fixing, although neither was involved in the case.4'
Clearly the Maryland Cooperative case is out of step with Maryland &
Virginia. To be sure, two cooperatives were not involved in the latter
but, as indicated earlier, the opinion implied disapproval of Maryland
Cooperative in its condemnation of a combination of competitors to sup-
press independent producers, processors, or dealers. Moreover, in the
light of Maryland & Virginia it is difficult to contend that Capper-
Volstead and section 6 of the Clayton Act grant agricultural cooperatives
the right to conduct their affairs with impunity.
AMERICAN COOPERATION 444 (1960). In the dairy cooperative field, ". . . Statistics
recently reported . . . show that in 1957 dairy cooperatives marketed almost 60% of
all whole milk sold by farmers to plants and dealers in the U.S. . . . Cooperatives now
inanufacture 58% of all creamery butter, 23% of the cheddar cheese, 74% of the non-
fat dry milk, and 70% of the dry buttermilk produced in the U.S." Maryland & Va.
Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960). Brief for Defendant,
p. 84, 87, citing Gessner & Krause, Dairy Cooperatives Report on. Integrated Activity,
NEws FOR FARMER COOPERATIVES (Feb. 1959) p. 12 (Emphasis added.)
39. For a criticism of the Court's decision see Stark, Capper-Volstead Revisited.
AMERICAN CoPERATIoN 453 (1960).
40. United States v. Maryland Co-op. Milk Producers, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 151
(D.D.C. 1956). The Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Association was co-
defendant. The Court granted the defendants' motion for acquital.
41. The Department of Justice so contended, Note, 44 VA. L. REV. 63, 72 citing
transcript of Record, p. 65, but apparently its argument was ignored.
NOTES
An examination of the extent and nature of the privilege conferred
by the common agent provision is important. Section 455 of the Co-
operative Marketing Act of 1926 provides that cooperatives may ex-
change "crop, market, statistical, economic and other similar information
[directly] and or by and through a common agent created or selected by
them."4" The Maryland Cooperative opinion stated that the use of a com-
mon agent would "inevitably" lead to price fixing. Be that as it may,
no price fixing privilege was granted and it is rather difficult to read
such a privilege into the section. It may well have been passed to insure
to cooperatives that which the Supreme Court determined in the early
trade association cases, i.e., that such information may freely be ex-
changed where no attempt is made to reach any agreement concerning
prices, production, or restraint of competition.4" It is extremely doubtful
that section 455 grants any greater privilege to cooperatives. Thus it
seems unlikely that a loose combination of cooperatives has any greater
privilege under the antitrust laws than a similar combination of business
corporations.
Cooperative mergers may require different treatment. It would seem
that the competitive market would be little affected where two or more
cooperatives, primarily dealing with the products of their members, merge
42. 44 Stat. 803, 7 U.S.C. § 455 (1958).
43. "Persons who unite in gathering and disseminating information in trade journals
and statistical reports on industry; who gather and publish statistics as to the amount
of production of commodities in interstate commerce, and who report market prices
are not engaged in unlawful conspiracies in restraint of trade merely because the
ultimate result of their efforts may be to stabilize prices or limit production through
a better understanding of economic laws and a more general ability to conform to them
for the simple reason that the Sherman Act neither repeals economic laws nor prohibits
the gathering and dissemination of information. . . . Trade associations or combina-
tions of persons or corporations which openly and fairly gather and disseminate informa-
tion as to the cost of their product, the volume of production, the actual price which the
product has brought in past transactions, stocks of merchandise on hand, approximate
cost of transportation . . . and who . . . meet and discuss such information and
statistics without however reaching or attempting to reach any agreement or any concerted
action with respect to prices or production or restraining competition, do not thereby
engage in unlawful restraint of commerce. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United
States, 268 U.S. 363 (1925) ; accord, Cement Manufacturers Protective Ass'n v. United
States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371
(1923); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921);
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914) ;
cf. Sugar Institute Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936). This is not to forget that
these privileges may be termed an unfair method of competition under § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. In FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948),
the Court distinguished the "old" Cement case and the Maple Flooring case on the
grounds that no attempt to fix prices was proven there, and that conduct while not
violating the Sherman Act may constitute an unfair method of competition prohibited
by § 5. Thus cooperatives, which are also under the FTC jurisdiction, have a substantial
privilege.
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into one." In addition, section 6 of the Clayton Act guarantees the ex-
istence of producers' associations and this would seem to militate against
the disallowance of such mergers under section 7 of the Clayton Act.
The trade practices and methods of competition of the merged coopera-
tive, however, would not be immune under the antitrust laws. Thus,
maximum benefit would seem to inure to cooperatives, independent pro-
ducers, and consumers.
Federated cooperatives are centralized marketing agencies in which
the local cooperatives hold stock. Although they are not expressly men-
tioned in the Capper-Volstead Act, their existence is authorized by the
language of the Act.45  The utilization of such an authorization confers
a substantial privilege on agricultural cooperation. As Judge Holtzoff
observed in the Maryland Cooperative case, Congress must have contem-
plated that a common marketing agency would fix the same prices for
the products of all its principals and would not discriminate among
them." The extent of the privilege can best be measured by reference to
antitrust cases dealing with such agencies." It is a fair conclusion that
non-privileged marketing agencies are permissible under the Sherman
Act only where "the group must meet effective competition in a fair
market and neither seeks nor is able to effect a domination of prices."'"
Needless to say, many federated cooperatives would not meet these
requirements. However, these cooperatives are entirely in accordance
with the Capper-Volstead Act and the declared policy of Congress to
"promote the effective merchandising of agricultural commodities."4 In
addition, the undue enhancement provision of section 2 of the Capper-
44. As Judge Holtzoff has observed, "It seems immaterial whether a large group of
farmers organizes a single organization or divides itself into several organizations."
United States v. Maryland Co-op. Milk Producers Ass'n, 145 F. Supp. 151, 154
(D.D.C. 1956) (dictum). See generally, Stark, Capper-Volstead Revisited, AMERICAx
COOPERATION 453 (1960) ; Givens, Affirmative Benefits of Industrial Mergers and Section
7 of the Clayton Act, 36 IND. LU. 51 (1960).
45. Mischler, Agricultural Cooperative Law, 30 RocKY MT. L. REv. 381 (1958);
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS 308 (1955); Jensen, The Bill of Rights of U.S. Cooperative Agriculture, 20
RocKY MT. I. REv. 181 (1948) ; 36 Ops. AT'ry GEN. 326 (1930). In addition federated
cooperatives are specifically mentioned in § 453 of the Cooperative Marketing Act of
1926. 44 Stat. 802, 7 U.S.C. § 453 (1958).
46. 145 F. Supp. 151, 154 (D.D.C. 1956).
47. See, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Appala-
chian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) ; Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United
States, 297 U.S. 533 (1926).
48. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 374 (1933).
49. The Attorney General's Committee found the validity of vertically engaged
federated cooperatives "less certain." It is difficult to understand the basis of this
position. Capper-Volstead provides for producer's associations throughout the marketing
channel, and as long as the trade practices and methods of competition of the federated
cooperative are in order, its vertical nature would not seem to militate against its validity.
NOTES
V6lstead Act precludes abuse of the privilege.5" As to its other trade
practices and methods of competition the federated cooperative would
seem to have no more immunity than the business corporation.
Prior to 1945, it would have been of little comfort to cooperative
members to be informed that their associations were permitted to acquire
100% of the market, where such control was acquired without resort to
restraints of trade. With the Alcoa"' decision, however, what has been
called the "new" Sherman Act came into existence. The conclusion is
inescapable that the drift toward per se standards, necessitated by the
admitted inability of the courts to cope with complex economic data, has
manifested itself in monopoly prohibitions." Where the courts once
spoke of mere size not being an offense under the Sherman Act, 3 one
may well contend today that overwhelming size is such an offense.54
Although Judge Hand in his Alcoa opinion stated that Congress forbade
all trusts, "good" and "bad," it has been pointed out that it is for Con-
gress to determine whether a monopoly not compelled by circumstance is
advantageous." By sanctioning cooperative existence in section 6 of
the Clayton Act, restating the privilege in the Capper-Volstead Act, and
by the Agriculture Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 Congress has so
determined. Thus it may be said that a cooperative may obtain over-
50. To be sure, the courts have been reluctant to look into the reasonableness of
the prices fixed, but such a course would be most proper where the strength of the
federated cooperative is overwhelming. Although it is doubtful that such strength exists
throughout the country, "cooperative marketing corporations are coming of age, their
political as well as their economic power is increasing, they are consolidating and
federating. Apparently the magnetic power toward corporative efficiency tends to pull
cooperative corporations along the same evolutionary path toward 'bigness' which
private profit corporations have followed." Jensen, The Bill of Rights of U.S. Co-
operative Agriculture, 20 Rocxy MT. L. REv. 181, 196 (1948).
51. United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1945).
52. For discussion of the trend, see, Kahn, A Legal and Economic Appraisal of
the 'New' Sherman and Clayton Acts, 63 YALE L.J. 293 (1954) ; Adams, The 'Rule of
Reason': Workable Competition or Workable Mo)wpoly?, 63 YALE L.J. 348 (1954);
Wood, The Report of the Attorney General's Committee Three Years After, 26 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 669 (1958) ; Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guidepost to a
Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MIcH. L. REv. 1139 (1952).
53. United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927); United
States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) ; United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918). But see, United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S.
106 (1932) ; United States v. Reading, 253 U.S. 26 (1920).
54. See, United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) ; Schine Chain Theatres,
Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948) ; United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U.S. 131 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946);
United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) ; United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), af'd per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) ; United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa.
1943), af'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 330 U.S. 806 (1947).
55. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 345 (D.
Mass. 1953), af!'d per curian, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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whelming power without running afoul of the "new" Sherman Act be-
cause of that power. The question remains, how may such a position be
attained?
In the realm of permissive cooperative monopoly nothing is more
certain than the validity of marketing orders or agreements involving
the Secretary of Agriculture and local producers. Any monopoly that
might result has the express approval of Congress and the Supreme
Court.56
A monopoly position properly may be attained in another manner.
Judge Wyzanski stated in the Cape Cad case, "It is not unlawful under
the antitrust acts for a Capper-Volstead cooperative to try to acquire
even 100% of the market if it does it exclusively through marketing
agreements approved under Capper-Volstead, skill, superiority of pro-
ducts, efficiency or like laudable steps.""7  This is consistent with the
position of the Department of Justice that the Capper-Volstead Act
"legitimates no more than securing such control over local supply as re-
sults from voluntary membership in an association by the local producers
or most of them. Any control over supply or price obtained by exclud-
ing non-member producers from the market . . ., which the association
could not achieve if it acted singly in collectively marketing the product
of its members, transcends the authorization of section 1 and thereby
becomes subject to antitrust law prohibitions.. ,,.
The Maryland & Virginia case has answered the question of how
far the immunity extends. In reversing the District Court's dismissal of
56. Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 61 Stat. 208, 7 U.S.C. § 608b.
"These associations of producers of milk have a vital interest in the establishment of an
efficient marketing system. This adequately explains their interest in securing the
adoption of an order believed -by them to be favorable for this purpose. If ulterior
motives of corporative aggrandizement stimulated their activities, their efforts were not
thereby rendered unlawful. If the Act and the [marketing] order are otherwise valid, the
fact that their effect would be to give cooperatives a monopoly of the market would not
violate the Sherman Act." The Court held the Act and the order valid. United States
v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 559, 560 (1939).
It is interesting to note that the Association utilized this lawful means of obtaining
market stability. Four months after the judgments in the District Court, the Association,
on behalf of its members, secured a marketing order for the Washington area. Brief
for Defendant, p. 94.
57. Cape Cod Food Prods., Inc. v. National Cranberry Ass'n, 119 F. Supp. 900,
907 (D. Mass. 1954). Jury charge. This opinion is significant because Judge Wyzanski
handed down the opinion in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp.
295 (D. Mass. 1953), where although the Court found that the defendant had not
obtained its position by illegal means, it was nevertheless a monopoly in restraint of trade.
58. Brief for Plaintiff, p. 13. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United
States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960). See also April v. National Cranberry Ass'n, 168 F. Supp.
919 (D. Mass. 1958) ; Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws 311 (1955).
NOTES
the section 2 charge, 9 the Court stated that Congress did not intend to
immunize "competition-stifling practices" under section 2 of the Sher-
man Act while holding cooperatives responsible for restraints of trade
under sections 1 and 3 of that Act. The Court added that the alleged
activities "are so far outside the 'legitimate objects' of a cooperative that
if proved, they would constitute clear violations of section 2 of the
Sherman Act .... .-" The decision, in effect, overrules the Dairy Co-op.
decision,"' a decision that held a cooperative immune from prosecution for
monopolistic practices, 2 and one that had been termed a "baited trap." 3
Hence, it is apparent that the cooperative's privilege in the face of mo-
nopoly prohibitions extends only to its existence-which is quite a sub-
stantial privilege-but does not grant the right to use its position to
"foreclose competitors, to gain a competitive advantage or to destroy a
competitor."'"
CONCLUSION
One need not choose between supporting the Maryland & Virginia
59. United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 45
(D.D.C. 1958). On the Defendant's motion, Judge Ioltzoff dismissed the Sherman
§ 2 charge. In the court's opinion, it was "quite apparent" that Congress in enacting
the Clayton and Capper-Volstead Acts had exempted the existence, activities and opera-
tions of agricultural cooperatives from the antitrust laws as long as combinations or
conspiracies with non-agricultural producers were not involved.
60. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458,
468 (1960). Among the particularized acts of monopolization and attempted monopoli-
zation charged in violation of § 2 were that the Association attempted to arrange for
non-member producers to sell to the Baltimore market; attempted to prevent truck
transportation of non-member's milk to Washington; attempted to exclude a competitor
cooperative from the Washington area; used as distributor's indebtedness to the
Association to obtain his account; boycotted a distributor who operated a grain store
to compel his purchases from the Association; and threatened to reduce prices to
distributor customers for resale under Government contracts to prevent an independent
distributor from successfully competing. Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 29-31.
61. United States v. Dairy Co-op. Ass'n, 49 F. Supp. 475 (D. Ore. 1943).
62. In the Dairy Co-op. case, the court said:
It may be that the acts of the defendant cooperative in this case, tested
without regard to the provisions of the Clayton Act, are monopolistic in
character. I have not given serious thought to that question, for it seems to me
when Congress said that cooperatives were not to be punished, even though they
became monopolistic, it would be as ill-considered for me to hold to the contrary
as were some of the early labor decisions. More ill-considered in fact, in view
of the serious consequences to the American people now known to have followed
from those decisions in the labor field.
49 F. Supp. at 475. This decision epitomizes the uncertainty that preceded and followed
the Borden decision and an attitude that does not recognize that unlike unionism "agricul-
tural cooperation is a method of doing business." Farmer Cooperative Service, U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Bull. No. 10, Legal Phases of Farmer Cooperatives 1 (1958).
See generally, Striefer v. Seafarers Sea Chest Corp., 162 F. Supp. 602, 607 (E.D. La.
1958) and cases cited footnote 28 supra.
63. Note, 44 VA. L. REv. 63, 82 (1958).
64. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).
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case and the agricultural cooperative movement. The requirement that
cooperatives be fair competitors certainly is not an unreasonable one,
The decision, along with the natural evolution thereof, it is submitted,
will insure the long run welfare of consumers, competitors, and the
producer-members of agricultural cooperatives. The privileges of agri-
cultural cooperation's infancy have been supplemented-not eradicated-
by the responsibility of its maturity.
P. G. LAKE-ITS EFFECT ON A CONVEYANCE BY THE LESSOR
OF A LEASE BONUS WITH A RETAINED ROYALTY
When a landowner conveys the mineral rights of his land to a pro-
ducer, it has become common for him to demand and to receive, in addi-
tion to a royalty interest in the minerals in place, a cash bonus in con-
sideration for the grant.1 Frequently, the cash bonus is not paid in a
lump sum on execution of the grant, but is extended over several years
in periodic installments.2 If after the execution of the lease, the lessor
wishes to dispose of part, but not all of his interest in the lease, the man-
ner of disposition must be carefully planned in order to avoid seriously
adverse tax consequences. The lessor wants to be certain that the grant
he makes will be regarded as the conveyance of a property interest. Thus,
the result will be capital gain in the event of a sale,3 and he will not be
regarded as having made an anticipatory assignment of income in the
event of a gift.' In order to ascertain with any degree of certainty the
probable tax consequences of a conveyance, for consideration or as a
gift, of such interests in oil and gas leases, it may be helpful to deter-
mine their character as "property." Whether a royalty and lease bonus
1. See Beveridge, The Federal Income Tax on Assignments of Oil & Gas Leases,
34 CALIF. L. REv. 117 (1946). The payment received by a lessor for granting a lease
is generally called a "lease bonus." See, e.g., Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404
(1940) ; Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932) ; G.C.M. 22730, 1940-1 Coau. BULL. 214;
Wellen, Recent Development in the Taxation of Oil and Gas Interests-Recent Decisions
and Rulings, SIXTH ANN. INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 479, 483 (1955).
2. See MILLER, OIL AND GAS FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 231-33 (3d ed. 1957). "In
recent years it has become the practice for a landowner to lease his land for oil and gas
for a bonus, payable not in one sum but in a series of installments, evidenced only by a
contract." Fiske, Tax Problems of Estates Owning Oil & Gas Properties, 13 OKLA. L.
REv. 267, 273 (1960).
3. J. D. Reynolds, 10 B.T.A. 651 (1928), acq. VII-2 Cu. BULL. 34 (1928); J. E.
Murphy, 9 B.T.A. 610 (1927), acq., VII-2 Cum. BULL. 28 (1928); G.C.M. 12118, XII-2
Coa. BULL. 119 (1933) ; I.T. 2524, IX-1 Cum. BULL. 199 (1930).
4. See, e.g., Lester A. Nordan, 22 T.C. 1132 (1954), nonacq., 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 11,
withdrawn, acq. in result only, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 4; R. E. Nail, 29 B.T.A. 33 (1932),
nonacq., 1949-1 Cum. BULL. 6.
